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DOMA’S GHOST AND COPYRIGHT REVERSIONARY
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright law typically is not thought of as intertwined with family
law.1 Still, a major theoretical underpinning of copyright’s incentive system
is that an author is motivated not only by the financial reward she hopes to
reap during her life, but also by whatever her family might reap long after
her death.2 And the Supreme Court’s highly anticipated decision in United
States v. Windsor3 complicates this family-incentive theory by undermining
Congress’s belief that an author would want her widow to inherit her rights.
Instead, it creates a situation in which federal law and state law too often
will recognize different heirs.
In Windsor, the Supreme Court held that Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), which denied federal benefits to same-sex spouses,4
raised federalism concerns and violated “due process and equal protection
principles.”5 The Obama Administration responded two days later by
making federal employee benefits available to “all legally married same-sex
spouses.”6 But the availability of gay marriage within each state, and the
state benefits derived therefrom, did not change. As of this writing, barely a
quarter of states—thirteen—allow same-sex couples to marry.7 These
circumstances put the federal Copyright Act’s use of state law in
*
Intellectual Property Fellow, Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, Columbia Law
School. Thanks to Will Baude, Elena Grieco, and James Grimmelmann for helpful feedback and to
Nathan Brenner, Chloe Rossen, Sarah Wilson, and the Colloquy staff for thoughtful edits.
1
Indeed, copyright law today is a wholly federal field, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012), and family law
historically has been “a virtually exclusive province of the States.” Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, No.
12-399, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 25, 2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 404 (1975)).
2
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15 (2003).
3
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
4
Pub. L. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)).
5
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691, 2693.
6
Memorandum from Elaine Kaplan, Acting Dir., United States Office of Pers. Mgmt., to Heads of
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (June 28, 2013), available at http://www.chcoc.gov/transmittals/
TransmittalDetails.aspx?TransmittalID=5700.
7
David Crary, Gay Marriage: In States, a Hodgepodge Lies Ahead, YAHOO! NEWS (June 29, 2013,
8:19 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/gay-marriage-states-hodgepodge-lies-ahead-201327666.html; SameSex Marriage Status in the United States by State, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/
US/fullpage/sex-marriage-sex-marriage-status-united-states-state-16715343 (last visited Sept. 29, 2013)
(offering an interactive updated map).
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determining reversionary interests on a collision course with its goal of
offering clarity as to author incentives and copyright ownership.
Though not as immediately apparent as changes to healthcare benefits
or tax-filing status, Windsor’s implications for copyright law are significant.
Invalidating Section 3 of DOMA means that a same-sex widow could
inherit her author wife’s copyrights free of federal estate taxes. However,
copyright law also dictates statutory heirs on reversionary interests—the
renewal right, previously, and the termination right8—and here a choice of
law conflict frequently will arise. The 1976 Copyright Act defines a
widow(er) as “the author’s surviving spouse under the law of the author’s
domicile at the time of his or her death.”9 Because the Windsor Court left in
place Section 2 of DOMA, which permits states to refuse to recognize a
same-sex marriage celebrated in another state,10 the reversionary interests
could skip a same-sex widow(er) and go entirely to the children. Beyond
being theoretically incongruous, this disparity undermines author incentives
and increases copyright transaction costs. And, with 2013 being the first
year in which a termination right could be exercised for works created
under the 1976 Copyright Act,11 courts soon will confront this choice of law
problem.
This Essay analyzes Windsor’s overlooked copyright implications and
argues that Congress should amend the Copyright Act to rely on the law of
the state of the marriage’s celebration. Doing so would add some
consistency to copyright law’s family-incentive theory. It also would
remove inefficient grants of copyright ownership that fail to motivate
authorship because the disposition is contrary to the author’s desires.
Further, such congressional action would guard against ownership
uncertainty that can frustrate copyright policy goals by increasing
deadweight loss.

8

Works created before 1978 were eligible for an initial term and a renewal term; if the renewal
owner failed to exercise that right, the work would fall into the public domain. See Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 217–19 (1990). Termination is an inalienable right that, regardless of any agreement to
the contrary, entitles the author or her statutory heir to take back the copyright after a fixed time of
roughly thirty-five years for works created on or after January 1, 1978, and fifty-six years for works
created before. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(3)–(5), 304(c) (2012); see also Marvel Characters, Inc. v.
Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 292 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding “that an agreement made subsequent to a work’s
creation which retroactively deems it a ‘work for hire’ constitutes an ‘agreement to the contrary’ under
§ 304(c)(5)” and thus is ineffective).
9
17 U.S.C. § 101.
10
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
11
For most copyright transfers executed on or after January 1, 1978, the earliest vesting termination
rights could be effected during a five-year window beginning January 1, 2013. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 203(a)(3).
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I. COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES AND THE FAMILY
Copyright law incorporates what could be considered a traditional
notion of the family. It uses state laws to dictate who belongs in an author’s
family and limits testamentary freedom accordingly. An author’s
widow(er)—as recognized by the state of the author’s death—is a statutory
heir, in addition to the author’s children, whether offspring or legally
adopted.12 Stepchildren, grandchildren, and “descendants beyond the first
degree” are not statutory heirs for the renewal right,13 but grandchildren are
for the termination right.14 If the author dies during the first copyright term
for works registered prior to January 1, 1978, the copyright may be renewed
by the widow(er) or the children. For works created on or after January 1,
1978, however, the author’s termination right automatically descends to the
widow(er) and the children, each taking a one-half interest; a majority—i.e.,
the widow(er) and at least one child—must agree to exercise a termination
right. The automatic descent of reversionary interests to statutory heirs
recognizes Congress’s assumption that an author will have greater
incentives to create if she knows that her immediate family might profit
from her works long after she is gone.15
Both the renewal and the termination rights provide the author with
another bite at the apple. Specifically, the termination right allows the
author to terminate any assignment (except when a “work for hire”),
including that of the renewal. In adding legislation on the termination right,
Congress sought to protect vulnerable authors from being forced into illadvised and unremunerative transfers.16 Termination gives an author, or her
family after her death, the chance to recapture a work and possibly
capitalize on its commercial success.
Renewal and termination rights are copyright incentives that fuel the
“engine of free expression.”17 Incentives need not be monetary—e.g.,
reputational or political rewards—but money talks, and copyright’s
incentive system generally is built upon financial rewards. Because the
Constitution authorizes Congress to provide these incentives “to promote
12
17 U.S.C. § 101. Even within the class of statutory heirs, Congress gave authors no testamentary
freedom. A spouse can only be divested by divorce, and there is no manner by which to divest children.
13
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 7:17 (2013). Under the 1909 Act, state law also
could exclude illegitimate children. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 582 (1956).
14
17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2)(A), 304(c)(2)(A).
15
This assumes that authors are indeed motivated by potential downstream rewards to family;
challenging that belief is beyond the scope of this Essay. But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255
(2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV.
219, 227 (arguing that spouses and children have been used as “props” to advance copyright industry
interests).
16
For a discussion of the legislative history on termination and an example of what Congress was
guarding against, see Brad A. Greenberg, Comment, More Than Just a Formality: Instant Authorship
and Copyright’s Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1028, 1060–61 (2012).
17
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).

104

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY

the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”18 creating private wealth for the
author is an ancillary benefit of advancing the public interest.19 Thus, the
efficiency of copyright allocations increases as incentives are better tailored
to maximize author production. But the marital-status conflict will lead to
inefficiencies in awarding termination rights.20
II. CONFLICT OF LAWS AND COPYRIGHT COSTS
No states permitted same-sex marriage when the 1976 Copyright Act
was enacted. DOMA, passed in 1996, ensured that even as states began
permitting same-sex marriage approximately ten years ago, there remained
a uniform metric for determining a copyright owner’s statutory widow(er).
DOMA gave the federal government exclusive authority to define marriage
in relation to federal benefits, including copyrights,21 and effectively
superseded the Copyright Act’s reliance on state law. While it is unclear
why Congress anchored the Copyright Act’s determination on the “law of
the author’s domicile at the time of his or her death,”22 it is clear that, under
DOMA’s blanket rule, the state of reference did not matter.23
In Windsor’s wake, however, the Copyright Act’s choice of state law
creates a conflict in which reversionary interests might not be devised per
Congress’s intent for an author who dies in a state that does not recognize
same-sex marriages lawfully entered into in another state. Yet because
termination rights are offered as author incentives, it makes little sense that
the law would devise these rights inconsistent with an author’s desires.
Accordingly, the new conflict between state and federal law may remove
from a gay or lesbian author an incentive that is available to straight
authors. Worse, it may result in a reduction of incentives for a gay or
lesbian author who would be discouraged to create if, for instance, she is

18
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. Counterintuitively, Science refers to copyrightable original works of
authorship and Arts refers to patentable inventions.
19
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (quoting
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)); Greenberg, supra note 16, at 1065
(also referencing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken).
20
The same would be true for renewal rights if any had yet to vest. However, because renewal
rights vest in the final year of the initial copyright term, which under the 1976 Act could be no later than
2005, there remain no renewal rights to devise. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2012).
21
And, to be sure, the Copyright Act is not the only federal law with a poorly designed choice of
state law provision. See generally William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal
Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012) (proposing designs for a federal choice of law system).
22
17 U.S.C. § 101. The legislative history does not evince a clear reason, other than “to avoid
problems and uncertainties” that arose under the 1909 Act’s renewal provision. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476,
at 125 (1976). It is unsurprising, though, considering that the domicile of death generally governs wills
and estates. See, e.g., EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 12:1 (2d ed. 2013).
23
At least, not in regards to an inconsistent recognition of a same-sex spouse. Choice of state law
did create consistency between federal law and that of the domicile at death on other differences among
states, including consanguinity and age restrictions.
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estranged from her children and would not want them to receive the entire
termination right.24
Additionally, employing the law of the author’s domicile at death
increases uncertainty about who owns the reversionary interests. This, in
turn, increases licensing transaction costs. Imagine an author who marries
her wife in Massachusetts and, while living in Boston, writes the next Great
American Novel. She and her wife adopt two boys, whom they raise in
Florida, which, at the time of her death twenty years later, neither permits
nor recognizes same-sex marriage. This scenario adds several costs to a
licensee or potential licensee. First, a publisher who buys the book’s rights
must identify the author’s domicile at the time of death and perform some
cursory legal research to determine whether the same-sex widow and
children must jointly file the termination notice or whether the children
could do it alone. Second, a potential licensee of the publisher’s book rights
could not simply look at a publicly available copyright registration to
deduce who could terminate the author’s previous assignment to the
publisher and thus prevent future exploitation absent a new license. And,
third, termination is more likely when the right goes solely to the children
and not also to the same-sex spouse, who may disagree with the children
about terminating the assignment or license.
By contravening an author’s desires and increasing transaction costs,
the Copyright Act’s choice of state law undermines the copyright-incentive
system and adds to its deadweight loss. But this need not be. Congress can
amend the Copyright Act to sharpen incentives and remove the additional
costs.
III. A SIMPLE SOLUTION?
Congress cannot remedy this incoherence by removing the choice of
state law from the Copyright Act and defaulting to a uniform federal
definition of an author’s spouse.25 If Congress amended the Copyright Act
to exclude a same-sex widow from taking a reversionary interest, the
amendment would appear to violate equal protection principles for the same
reasons Section 3 of DOMA did; if the law defined spouses as members of
either the same or opposite sex, the law would raise the federalism concerns
noted in Windsor. But Congress does have two viable alternatives.26
The first is to do away with the Copyright Act’s restraint on
testamentary freedom. Copyright law’s designation of statutory heirs is
24

Whether that poses a different equal protection question will not be answered here.
This is unlike Congress’s ability, as realized in the 1976 Act, to override state laws excluding
illegitimate children from the statutory heir class.
26
Absent congressional action, Will Baude also suggests a third approach to the general choice of
law problem: Federal courts could treat a couple as married if their home state does. Baude, supra note
21, at 1418–23. Though sensible, this approach would not address the copyright-specific issues raised in
this Essay.
25
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atypical among the property and quasi-property fields.27 It has the effect of
“estate-bumping,”28 which means that it can produce property dispositions
contrary to an author’s intent, even when the author executed a will. And, as
discussed above, forcing an author’s estate to devise the reversionary
interests can remove or even reduce author incentives to create. Moreover,
the testamentary limitations only apply to the reversionary interests, making
possible a scenario in which an author wills her copyrights to a specific
person but is forced to leave to her statutory heirs a reversionary right to
divest her will’s beneficiary later. Removing these limitations would
improve the efficiency of copyright law’s incentive system and would add
some coherence to the law’s theory of the family.
Giving authors such testamentary freedom would, however, resurrect
an old problem. Recall Congress’s rationale for adding the termination right
in the first place. Before the 1976 Act, publishers frequently forced authors
to assign both the initial copyright term and the renewal right, effectively
negating any chance for the author or her family to take a second bite. To
spare termination the same fate, the 1976 Act prohibits an author from
waiving, assigning, or otherwise disclaiming a termination right.29 It is an
inalienable right. If Congress removed statutory heirs from the Copyright
Act and gave authors full testamentary freedom over their copyright estates,
it would not simply be foreseeable that publishers, studios, record labels,
and other content distributors would force all but the most successful
authors to assign termination rights; it would be inevitable.30
The other option is to craft a better choice of law provision. This could
be done numerous ways. I focus here on two.
One approach would be to choose the law of the author’s domicile at
the time the work is created. Rather than focusing on where the author
resided when she died, the law could look to where the work came to life.
This would provide authors with a clearer understanding of their incentives
to create and would reduce uncertainty of ownership. The ex ante notice to
authors would serve copyright law’s constitutional purpose of promoting
27

Copyright law’s forced heirship is similar to state laws concerning an omitted spouse or child,
except that the statutory heirs cannot be contravened by explicit authorial intent. The inflexible nature of
termination’s descent is a consequence of authors asking for such a failsafe to prevent publishers from
demanding assignment of the new termination right.
28
Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 109,
111 (2006).
29
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
30
Though alienability of property interests generally has economic benefits, the experience of the
1909 Act’s assignable renewal rights suggests copyright reversionary interests are different. See, e.g.,
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESSION, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 53 (Comm.
Print 1961). “[P]ermitting assignments of contingent interests made that benefit largely illusory.” Lydia
Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the “Inalienable” Right to Terminate,
62 FLA. L. REV. 1329, 1344 (2010).
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cultural advancement while limiting attendant restrictions on others’
speech. It also would come without expense to the law’s internal author
protections in the form of the termination right, which can be thought of
separately as preserving an incentive. Further, using the domicile of
authorship would enable potential licensees to avoid thirty-five years of
wondering where the author will die. Instead, they would know
immediately whether copyright reversionary interests would pass to the
children only or also to a same-sex widow.
But this would not remove the conflict between federal and state laws
in many situations.31 Worse, it could actually increase conflicts. Choosing
the state of authorship would freeze in time an author’s marital status—
possibly long before death and many years before the author marries—and,
to avoid raising equal protection concerns, it would have to apply equally to
opposite-sex marriages. Such an approach also would inject a new
challenge: determining when the work was created. For works completed in
more than one sitting, each component part authored in a different state
could substantially cloud certainty as to which state’s laws would apply.
Instead, the approach that appears best tailored to promoting copyright
policy goals is to choose the law of the state in which the marriage was
celebrated. If the state of celebration recognizes the author as lawfully
married, the Copyright Act would, too. First, this would erase most, if not
all, conflicts by directing the Copyright Act to choose a state law that
matches the Obama Administration’s marital recognition without taking
from states the power to determine whether two individuals are married.
Second, it would give an author clarity regarding whether a same-sex
spouse will receive not only federal-estate-tax-free copyrights, if so
bequeathed, but also the copyright reversionary interests. That, in turn,
would preserve an incentive that Congress intended authors to have and, at
the least, give copyright law a more consistent family-incentive theory.
Finally, choosing the state of celebration would accomplish these benefits
without jeopardizing author protections.
To be sure, such a choice of law could increase transaction costs by
making it even more difficult to determine whether an author was married.32
It also could result in new conflicts if the federal government moved away
from the Obama Administration’s “legally married” criteria for federal
benefits.33 However, those costs and conflicts are significantly fewer than
those created by choosing the law of the author’s domicile at death.

31

Indeed, there are authors working outside of California and New York.
Such questions—e.g., What is a lawful marriage?—are numerous. See Baude, supra note 21, at
1382–87.
33
An additional challenge would be federalizing a public-policy exception for foreign marriages
that both are contrary to law and exceptionally offensive to common decency. State courts already
utilize such an exception to refuse to recognize polygamous marriages or those between extremely
32
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Windsor
removed any consistency from the federal Copyright Act’s choice of state
law in determining reversionary interests. Conflicts too often will arise
between federal law, which cannot force a same-sex widow to pay estate
taxes on her author wife’s copyrights, and the laws of states that refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage, which would bar the same-sex
widow from receiving termination rights under the federal Copyright Act.
These conflicts, in turn, will reduce author incentives and increase
uncertainty of ownership. But Congress can remedy this conflict by
choosing the law of the state in which the author’s marriage was celebrated,
instead of looking to the state of the author’s death or where the work was
authored.

closely related individuals. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
333–36 (6th ed. 2010).
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